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RECENT CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COURT-MARTIAL-

JURISDICTION OF

MILITARY COURTS

Toth, recently honorably discharged from the U.S. Air Force,
was arrested in the United States by military police and sent to
Korea to be tried by a court-martial for a murder alleged to have
been committed while he was in the service there. This procedure
was carried out under 64 Stat. 1.09, 50 U.S.C. §553, art. 3a
(1950), which provides that if a person commits a serious crime
while in the service, the courts-martial will retain jurisdiction
even after that person has been discharged, if the civilian courts
can not establish jurisdiction to try the crime. Held: (in a 6-3
decision) The statute extending the jurisdiction of the military
courts to ex-servicemen is unconstitutional in that it violates the
right to indictment by grand jury provided by U.S. CONST. Amend.
V. United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
The statute was enacted because of the decision in U.S. v. Cooke,
336 U.S. 210 (1949) which held that a person who committed
a crime while in the service could not be tried by a court-martial
once he was discharged. This holding allowed criminals to escape
justice since many crimes committed in the military are not
discovered until after discharge. There was a desire in Congress
to alleviate the situation by statute. The obvious thing to do would
be to extend the jurisdiction of the federal civilian courts to cover
such crimes. However, many crimes by servicemen are committed
abroad, and Congress was not sure that they had the power to
extend federal jurisdiction to cover acts committed outside of the
territorial limits of the United States, Hearings Before House
Subcommittee on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 822
(1949). As a result they worded the statute so that the courtmartial would retain jurisdiction of any crime committed in the
service if the civilian courts could not establish jurisdiction.
The Judge Advocate General of the Army warned Congress
that any extension of military jurisdiction to ex-servicemen would
violate the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution,
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Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 256 (1949). See also
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS (2nd ed. p. 105);
31 Op. ATTY. GEN. 521.
The majority of the court agreed with the Judge Advocate. The
fifth amendment provides for indictment by grand jury "except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces." It was held that no
case had arisen against Toth while he was in the service because
he had not been indicted until he was discharged. See In re
Pacific Railway Commission, 32 Fed. 241, 255 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1887).
The dissent felt that the statute was a reasonable extension of
Congress's power to govern the land and naval forces provided
by U.S. Const. art. I. This view was taken in the case of In re
Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas. 796, No. 1,596 (C.C. Cal. 1873) which interpreted a statute similar to the one now in question. The problem of violation of the fifth amendment was disposed of by saying
that "cases arising in the land and naval forces," as used in the
amendment, meant simply that the cause of action arose there,
and not that an indictment on the cause had been brought.
Both the majority and minority assumed, almost without discussion, that Congress could extend federal jurisdiction to offenses
against the United States, no matter where committed. There is
some authority for this, Cook v. U.S., 138 U.S. 157 (1891);
U.S. v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
The decision in the principal case settled two problems which
have been in dispute for many years. First, it is now clear that
the word "case," as used in the fifth amendment, means that an
indictment has been brought on evidentiary facts. Second, it is
now apparently settled that Congress is in no way limited by
territory in prescribing the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
Lry offenses against the laws of the United States.
The far-reaching effect of the decision is hobbled somewhat by
Lhe fact that most criminal laws of the United States are limited
'o acts done "within the special maritime and territorial jurisdic:ion. . . ." 18 U.S.C. §2031 (rape); 18 U.S.C. §1111 (murder).
[t does no good to have jurisdiction potentially unlimited by territory when the statutes defining crimes within that jurisdiction
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are limited by territory. See 18 U.S.C. §7, defining "maritime
and territorial jurisdiction," and see Beal, Conflict of Laws,
§426.1 (1935). Evidently, therefore, the problem of trying ex
servicemen still exists, at least as to those crimes committed
outside the United States. It could be argued that the Unifornr
Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 145, 50 U.S.C. §551-741
(1950), which does not put a territorial limit on the crime,
defined, is a law passed by Congress, and thus a violation of i
would be a "case arising under the.., laws ...of the Unitec
States" within the jurisdiction of federal courts as provided il
U.S. Const. art. III § 2. Under this reasoning when a person i.,
discharged he is still subject to indictment for violating militar3
law, but the indictment may be brought in a civilian court.
Walter W. Steele, Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PROCESS-WAIVER OF RIGHTS

D, a Negro, was indicted for rape while he was absent fron
the state. Upon his arraignment, two years after the indictment
he filed a motion to quash the indictment because of the systema
tic exclusion of Negroes from the grand jury. The trial court re
fused the motion, relying on a state statute. This statute require(
such motions to be filed within three days after the term of th,
grand jury, or upon arraignment, whichever was sooner. The cout
said that since the motion had not been filed during this period
the right was waived. Held: D waived his constitutional right be
cause of his voluntary act of fleeing the state. Poret v. State o
Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955).
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known righl
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). It applies to all right
intended solely for the individual's benefit. Sartin v. Hudson, 14
S.W.2d 817, 823 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). As stated in Shutte
Thompson, 82 U.S. 151 (1873), a party may waive any pr(
vision of a statute or constitution intended for his benefit.
There is conflict as to which of the rights guaranteed by th
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution may b
waived. Most jurisdictions say that the right to trial by jur
Jones v. State, 52 Tex. Crim. Rep. 303, 106 S.W. 435 (1907'
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and the right to be present for pronouncement of judgment, Ball
v. U.S., 140 U.S. 118 (1891) can not be waived in capital cases.
Contra: People v. Bradner, 107 N.Y. 1, 13 N.E. 87 (1887).
The constitutional right to contest the composition of the grand
jury from which members of your race have been systematically
excluded has been upheld since Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1880). For an annotation on this right see, 1 A.L.R. 2d
1286 (1948). This right became more secure with Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). See 39 Ky. L. J. 65 (1950) for a
comment on this right. No authority that it can be waived has
been found, except the broad statement that "a constitutional right
may be forfeited ... by the failure to make timely assertion of
the right." Yakus v. U.S., 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 362 (1926).
The majority opinion relies on Yakus, supra, stating that the
defendant's voluntary absence was the cause of the failure to
timely assert his right. Apparently there was an assumption that
the defendant had notice of the indictment against him before he
fled since the dissent states that the record shows a lack of such
notice. This assumption on the part of the majority would destroy
the well established maxim that "waiver presupposes knowledge,"
and lead to disastrous decisions. Without knowledge as a necessary counterpart of waiver, a person visiting out of state during
the statutory period for asserting the right could be indicted for
a crime of which he knows nothing. Under this decision, he would
waive his right to contest the grand jury which had maliciously
indicted him, although he never had an opportunity to assert his
right. The above problem was presented in Carter v. Texas, 177
U.S. 442 (1899), cited by the dissent. The court in the Carter
case recognized that the defendant could not be held to have
waived this right since, in reality, he had had no opportunity to
comply with the state statutory requirement.
The dissent points out that the flight of the defendant was a
federal crime, under 62 Stat. 755, 18 U.S.C. sec. 1073 (1948),
and should be punished. But to use this flight so as to cause a
waiver of a right in another case is a dangerous doctrine. The
right to raise defenses permitted others, despite one's guilt or
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innocence in another case, has been strongly protected. Hovey v.
Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1896).
It seems that the majority opinion is a very precarious and
dangerous precedent to establish, considering the fact that this
question appears to be one of first impression. The court could
have reached the same result by basing its decision on a much
safer and a less controversial ground. The defendant in the present case pleaded not guilty, filed a motion for severance, and
then for the first time made his motion to quash. Clearly, this was
an untimely assertion of a constitutional right, under the doctrine
of O'Neill v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 324 (1891), and he thereby
forfeited his right to claim it. The court could have used the well
established rule that unless the motion to quash is made before
arraignment it is considered waived. State v. Sandiford, 149 La.
933, 90 So. 261 (1921). By deciding a constitutional question
which it need not have decided, the court seems to have promulgated a dangerous precedent for future decisions.
Malcolm E. Dorman.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ILLEGAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

Appellant and others were charged with conspiring to engage
in horse-race bookmaking. Appellant pleaded not guilty but was
convicted on the basis of evidence obtained from wire tapping,
microphone installations, and forcible entries and seizures. This
evidence was admitted over the objections of appellant. Held:
Conviction set aside; the illegally obtained evidence was inadmissible. People of Californiav. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d
905 (1955, 4-3 decision).
The problem involved in the principal case is whether or not
evidence which has been obtained in violation of both federal
and state constitutions and laws is admissible to secure the conviction of a defendant in a criminal suit. This case reversed the
prevailing California rule, see People v. Le Doux, 155 Cal. 535,
102 Pac. 517 (1909), and People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205
Pac. 435 (1922), and adopted the exclusionary rule over the
arguments of stare decisis. A distinction which was not discussed
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by the court in this case has been drawn between evidence obtained
in violation of the federal constitution and evidence obtained in
violation of federal statutes not involving an illegal search or
seizure, e.g., wire tapping evidence obtained in violation of the
Federal Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 47 U.S.C.
§ 151, § 605 1934). See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); Weiss
v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
The Bill of Rights has long been recognized as limiting only
the federal government. Barron v. Mayor and Council of the City
of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1833). However, the
fourteenth amendment has been held to give protection from
state action to some, but not to all, of the "fundamental rights"
under the due process clause of that amendment. See Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). The right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures has been given such protection, but it has been held that the constitutional sanctions against
illegal searches and seizures do not prevent the use of evidence
obtained thereby in state courts, a distinction having been drawn
between the illegality of the search or seizure and the probative
value of the evidence. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
The federal courts and some of the state courts have adopted
the rule that such evidence is inadmissible. Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1885); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914). However, the majority of the state courts and all of the
British Commonwealth countries hold that even though the evidence is illegally obtained, it can be admitted to secure the conviction of criminals. For a listing of the jurisdictions following
each of these rules and the leading cases on this point, see the
appendices to the Wolf case, supra, 338 U.S. 25, 33-39.
Texas may be numbered among the followers of the doctrine
of the Weeks case, for this state adopted the exclusionary rule
in its broadest form by statute. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 727a.
For a discussion of the development and present status of Texas
and federal law on this subject, see Ray, Restrictions on the Use
of Illegally Obained Evidence, 9 Sw. L. J. 434 (1955).
The opposing considerations are: First, criminals should be
apprehended and punished. They should not be allowed to break
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the law and go free on technicalities. Second, and possibly more
important, the public as a whole should be protected from illegal
searches and seizures.
There appear to be only three sanctions to prevent illegal
searches and seizures: (1) exclusion of the evidence which is
secured by unreasonable and illegal means, (2) criminal prosecutions against those responsible for the illegal searches and seizures, and (3) civil liability. The majority opinion in the principal case and those against the admission of such evidence argue
that the exclusionary rule is the only effective sanction. See also,
the dissenting opinions in the Wolf case, supra. Those for the
admission of such evidence argue that criminal and civil liability
should be increased and enforced. But, they argue, the evidence
once obtained should be admissible, for the illegality of the
search or seizure does not affect the truth of the evidence. Therefore, they contend that the fact that such evidence was illegally
obtained should, at most, be for the consideration of the jury in
weighing the evidence. Exponents of this view would punish both
wrongdoers, the accused and those responsible for the illegal
search and seizure.
The dissenters in the principal case also argued that change
such as this should come through legislation, not through court
action. They felt that there were no such compelling reasons presented as would justify this departure from stare decisis.
The present status of the law on this point is: (1) Illegally
obtained evidence is inadmissible in federal courts when timely
objection is made. Weeks v. United States, supra. (2) Each state
can determine the admissibility of such evidence by judicial decision or legislation. Wolf v. Colorado, supra. (3) California has
followed the recent trend, adopting the exclusionary rule, as
shown by the principal case. (4) It seems to be an open question
as to whether Congress can abrogate the federal exclusionary rule
by statute. It is also undecided as to whether or not Congress can
extend the exclusionary rule and make it applicable to proceedings in state courts under the authority of the fourteenth amendment. For a discussion of these two possibilities, see Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's majority opinion in the Wolf case at 338 U.S.
25, 33.
Bob Dickenson.
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EVIDENCE-HEARSAY-ADMISSIBILITY

OF CONFESSION OF

CO-CONSPIRATOR

D and others were prosecuted for conspiring to sell, and for
selling illicit alcohol. The trial court admitted a confession of one
of defendants, which mentioned names of other co-defendants, the
confession being made after the conspiracy had ended. D claimed
such confession was hearsay as to him, and that the court's admission thereof was an abuse of its discretion. Held: Admission
of hearsay evidence is not an abuse of the court's discretion, if
accompanied by an instruction to the jury to disregard the confession when considering the guilt of other co-defendants. United
States v. Paoli, 229 F.2d 319 (1956).
It has frequently been held that if evidence in the form of a
confession of one conspirator is given, after the conspiracy has
ended, it is hearsay as to the other conspirators. Tofanelli v. United
States, 28 F.2d 581 (1928). For such evidence to be permitted
if there are co-defendants, it must be clearly confined to the conspirator who confessed. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006
(1932). If a confession or statement of a conspirator is to be
used against his co-conspirators the hearsay rule exception requires such statement to have been made before the conspiracy
was abandoned. Otherwise the statement or confession is beyond
this exception to the hearsay rule and not admissible as to any
parties but the person making it. D claims in the principal case
that since his co-defendant made the confession after the conspiracy had ended that the confession could not be introduced
because it would prejudice his rights with the jury.
While it has been recognized that such evidence is hearsay as
to co-defendants, the cases have fashioned a rule which allows
such confessions to be put before the jury, if the judge clearly
instructs the jury not to consider the confession in determining
the guilt of persons not making them. Campanelli v. United States,
13 F.2d 750 (1926); United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360
(1948); Skiskowski v. United States, 158 F.2d 177 (1946);
Metzler v. United States, 64 F.2d 203 (1933). To contradict this
authority D relied on Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440
(1949) which held, following the general rule, that if the state-
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ment is made after the conspiracy has been abandoned, it is
hearsay when used against a co-conspirator. In the Krulewitch
case however, the defendant was being tried alone, the statements
were not those of a co-defendant, but were extraneous statements
of a co-conspirator brought in to be used against the defendant.
The dissent in the principal case feels these differences "have
no practical significance," and yet in the first case the testimony
which is hearsay is being introduced against the defendant himself, while in the case at bar it is being used against the person
who spoke it, and not in determining D's guilt.
The principal point of conflict comes with regard to the effect
of the court's instruction to the jury to disregard the confession
in determining the guilt of those not making it. This is undoubtedly
why the dissent feels there is no difference between the two cases
given above. The dissent claims that the cautionary admonition
had no effect on the jury, and that in fact it considered the confession in determining the guilt of the other parties. There is much
truth to this claim, as the majority admits on p. 321. However,
the majority goes on to say that it is a matter for the discretion
of the trial judge as to whether the evidence was prejudicial. The
court then decided that in light of the facts in this case that there
was no abuse of discretion. The concurring judge felt that juries
can and do usually follow the court's admonition, and merely said
that when considering all the facts of the trial that it did not
appear that there was any abuse of the lower court's discretion.
The problem raised by the dissent, although it may be true, seems
without reasonable remedy if we are to continue our present jury
system, for it is common to any situation where inadmissable
evidence is tendered to the jury, and then disallowed by the court.
Perhaps the best solution would be to provide for separate
trials, in which case, under the Krulewitch rule, supra, the confession would not be admissable at the trial of the other defendants. However, this was not done, and the confession was admitted
into evidence as part of the case against the specific defendant
who made the confession, and not against any others. It must be
decided if this was error. When accompanied by an instruction to
the jury not to use it for any other reason, it is clear that the
authority says this will not be legally prejudicial as to the other
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co-defendants. While in fact it may be prejudicial, it seems too
late for the courts to so hold, and if a different rule requiring
severance in such cases is needed, the addition of such a severance
rule should be done by legislation, not a reversal of previous
court rulings.
Thomas H. Davis.
NEGLIGENCE-ATTRACTIVE

NUISANCE-LIABILITY OF INDEPEND-

ENT CONTRACTOR AND

HIS

SUPPLIER

Action for injuries sustained by a minor child when a lumber
pile upon which he was playing collapsed. The lumber had been
stacked upon the premises by defendant lumber company. An
independent contractor was in possession of the land and in the
process of building a home for the landowner. The lumber had
been stacked in accordance with the custom of the trade and there
was no evidence that such a custom constituted a negligent manner
of stacking. Held: The builder was found liable on the basis of
maintaining an attractive nuisance which caused the injury; the
supplier was found liable on principles of ordinary negligence.
Kahn v. lames Burton Co. 5 Ill. 2d 614, 126 N.E. 2d 836 (1955).
The doctrine of attractive nuisance has been recognized as a
means of enforcing a strong social policy to protect child trespassers, since the common law allowed no recovery against the
possessor of the land for injuries suffered by a trespasser on
the land. City of Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Ill. 141, 39 N.E. 485
(1895). The Courts have reasoned that there is an "implied invitation" resulting from the attraction the instrumentality on the
land has for children, giving the child a status of an invitee rather
than a trespasser. Moore v. N. Chicago Ref. & Smelters, 346 Ill.
App. 530, 105 N.E.2d 553 (1947). The better authorities now
agree however, that the element of attraction is important only
insofar as the trespass can be anticipated and that the real basis
of liability is one of simple negligence based on the fact of foreseeable harm and subsequent failure to take precautions to protect the child trespasser from the harm. Banker v. McLaughlin,
146 Tex. 434, 208 S.W.2d 843 (1948); PROSSER, TORTS, 619
(1941).
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Lumber piles have provided prolific sources of lawsuits for injuries to children, some courts as a matter of law regarding them
not to be within the attractive nuisance doctrine. Morris v. Lewis
Mfg. Co., 331 Mich. 252, 49 N.W.2d 164 (1951). The better view,
however, seems to be that a lumber pile may be of such a nature
and in such a location as to attract children, and it is for the jury
to determine this fact. Gimmestad v. Rose Bros. Co., 194 Minn.
531, 261 N.W. 194 (1935). In the present case, the court followed
the view of allowing the jury to determine the attractiveness of
the lumber pile. In view of the builder's knowledge of children
in the area and his failure to take precautionary action to prevent
the trespass, the imposition of liability upon him is justified.
The basis of the supplier's liability, however, presents a different question. The court states that the supplier breached a common law duty owed the child trespasser. This duty is based upon
constructive knowledge of children in the area specifically charged
to him as a matter of law, plus further knowledge of the children's
likely trespass due to the implied invitation of the premises.
Despite the fact that the Court speaks of the presence of these
children in the neighborhood and of their tendencies as a matter
of common knowledge charged to everyone, this seems to be a
highly unreasonable extension of duty. Especially in light of the
fact that the supplier was on the premises only for the short time
necessary to stack the lumber. It also seems unjustified inasmuch
as there was no evidence that the lumber had been stacked
negligently.
This rationale by the court has imposed a standard of forseeability of harm solely from the placing of a lumber pile on the
land. This reasoning overlooks the basic rule of negligence that
general forseeability of possible harm is not always coincidental
with a specific duty to the injured person. Palsgraf v. Long Island
Ry. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). It is true that duty
has been extended to unforseeable plaintiffs in certain instances,
contrary to the Palsgraf case, but those cases are limited to situations where a single factor caused the injury, and that factor
was exclusively in the control of the defendant. Jackson v. Lowenstein & Bros. 175 Tenn. 535, 136 S.W.2d 495 (1940). Miss. Pac.
R. Co. v. Johnson, 198 Ark. 1134, 133 S.W.2d 33 (1939). In
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the instant case, there was no specific factor causing injury;
rather a combination of conditions caused it.
.When certain conditions are created, responsibility for taking
affirmative action may shift from the defendant to a subsequent
party, such as the contractor in the instant case, and the defendant is free to assume that the party will act reasonably. Pearson
v. Cauldwell Wingate Co., 187 F.2d 832 (2nd Cir. 1951). It
seems logical, therefore, that the supplier's negligence can only
be predicated on his leaving the lumber with an intervening responsible agency, when he has actual knowledge that such agency
will not act reasonably in maintaining the lumber pile. Ill. Cent.
Ry. v. Oswald, 338 Ill. 270, 170 N.E. 247 (1930). It is illogical,
under these facts, however, to charge the supplier with constructive knowledge that his customer will not act reasonably in
the maintenance of the lumber.
The social aspect of balancing the risk against the reasonableness of the conduct creating the risk should be examined. The
supplier did everything he reasonably could have done to prevent
any injury. The decision stands for a broad extension of dutyso broad as to prevent legal delineation.
Perhaps it is a mere coincidence that the duty of the supplier
enunciated by the court is the same as that of the land possessor.
It might be practical to assume that the court has arbitrarily
charged the supplier with a duty customarily attributed to an
occupier of land. If so, then the attractive nuisance doctrine has
once again put itself at odds with sound tort liability, and a
person not in possession of land is hereby charged with a duty
to maintain the land in a condition safe for children.
John R. Vandevoort.
NEGLIGENCE-LAST CLEAR CHANCE-NEGLIGENTLY INATTENTIVE

PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff was negligently struck by defendant's truck while
standing on the shoulder of a highway. The driver of defendant's
truck saw plaintiff from a distance of about a quarter of a mile,
and although he had the opportunity to avoid the accident, he
failed to do so. The evidence showed that plaintiff negligently
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placed himself in this position of peril, from which he was able
to remove himself, but that he was unaware of the approaching
truck. Held: the doctrine of last clear chance is recognized in
Virginia, and is applicable in this type of case because, although
the plaintiff's peril was the result of his own negligent inattentiveness, the defendant not only actually saw the plaintiff but also
realized or should have realized his peril. Greear v. Noland Company, - Va. -, 89 S.E.2d 49 (1955).
At common law contributory negligence of the plaintiff was a
complete defense when this was a factor in causing the injury
complained of. Even though the defendant's negligence was much
more severe than that of the plaintiff, the plaintiff was denied any
recovery because of his relatively minor negligence. This unfair
result has caused exceptions to the rule to be formulated by most
courts. One such exception, called the comparative negligence
doctrine, is a method used in maritime law, Lindgren v. United
States, 281 U.S. 114 (1930), and has been adopted by statute
in a few states. See Wis. STATS. (1953) section 331.045; Miss.
CODE ANN. 1930, sections 511, 512. The method employed by
this doctrine is a determination of the degree of negligence of
each party, with damages being apportioned accordingly. The last
clear chance doctrine is another exception which seeks to give
relief to a plaintiff, who though negligent, still deserves compensation. Liability is determined under this doctrine by inquiry as to
who had the last chance to avoid the accident.
A distinction is drawn under the last clear chance doctrine in
the majority of jurisdictions, between whether the plaintiff's failure to remove himself from peril resulted from helplessness or
merely from his inattentiveness. PROSSER, TORTS, § 52 (1955).
Where the plaintiff is in a helpless situation defendant would be
liable for any injury he caused if he saw plaintiff, or if he should
have seen him in the exercise of due care. Leinbach v. Pickwick
Greyhound Lines, 138 Kans. 50, 23 P.2d 449 (1933); RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 479. In this situation defendant is under a high
standard of care, and he will be held liable whether he actually
realized plaintiff's danger or not. Where the plaintiff is merely
inattentive and could escape except for this inattention, a lesser
standard of care is imposed on the defendant. He must have seen

1956]

RECENT CASE NOTES

the plaintiff and realized or should have realized the plaintiff's
situation. Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Croly, 54 Ind.
App. 566, 96 N.E. 973 (1911).
Most states have adopted the doctrine with certain modifications. In Texas it is called the discovered peril doctrine, and the
modification has been to impose a lesser standard of care upon
the defendant. To hold the defendant liable under this doctrine
he must have actually discovered plaintiff's perilous position and
realize that the plaintiff cannot remove himself in time to have
avoided the injury by use of all prudent means at his disposal.
Turner v. Texas Co., 138 Tex. 380, 159 S.W.2d 112 (1942). Furthermore it is immaterial that defendant should have seen the
plaintiff, if in fact he did not. Thompson v. Creech, 284 S.W.2d
256 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
In the principal case the problem presented was of the negli.
gently inattentive plaintiff. The Virginia court adopted the general majority rule, stating that if it was found, upon retrial, that
the plaintiff negligently placed himself in a situation of peril
from which he was able to remove himself, but that he was unaware of this peril, and that defendant saw him and realized or
should have realized plaintiff's danger in time to avoid striking
him, then under last clear chance plaintiff should be entitled to
recover. This changed the previous line of holdings in Virginia,
which based recovery on whether or not plaintiff's negligence was
the proximate cause or the remote cause, but had not recognized
the doctrine of last clear chance as such, and this change cleared
up much uncertainty in the case of the negligently inattentive
plaintiff. Anderson v. Payne, 189 Va. 712, 54 S.E.2d 82 (1949).
The effect of relieving the defendant from as great a standard
of care when dealing with a negligently inattentive plaintiff, is
to effect a more equal balance between the two negligent parties.
This seems a desirable refinement of the last clear chance doctrine
because, although it is against the doctrine's original intent of
protecting the plaintiff from the harshness of contributory negligence, it seems to be a desirable departure in order to keep the
harshness from merely swinging from the plaintiff to the defendant.
Thomas H. Davis.
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P, an employee of D, found $1000 in currency buried in a
fruit jar while digging in the dirt floor of D's garage. P claimed
possession as the finder of treasure trove. D asserted rightful
possession as owner of the locus in quo. Held: Treasure trove is
not recognized as a doctrine of Texas law; therefore, buried money
constitutes either lost or mislaid property. Here the money was
buried intentionally and thus, as a matter of law, could not be
lost property. As mislaid property, its possession is in the landowner. Schley v. Couch . ........... Tex------ , 284 S.W.2d 333
(1955).
In a concurring opinion, Judge Calvert would award possession
to the landowner on the basis that the property is neither lost,
mislaid, nor treasure trove, but that it is personal property attached
to the soil and a finder thereof acquires no right of possession.
Judge Wilson in a concurring opinion would abrogate all distinctions as to whether buried property is lost or mislaid, and award
possession to the landowner as a matter of law, thereby eliminating speculation as to intent of the true owner, since it is never
certain that the true owner buried them.
The common law recognized all property as either lost, mislaid, abandoned, treasure trove, or personal property attached
to the soil. Lost property has been defined as that which the owner
has involuntarily suffered to pass from his possession. Jackson v.
Steinberg, 186 Or. 129, 200 P.2d 376 (1948). Mislaid property
is that which the owner has voluntarily laid in a place where he
can resort to it again, and has forgotten where he placed it. Kincaid v. Eaton, 98 Mass. 139, 93 Am. Dec. 142 (1867). At comcon law, property was determined to be lost or mislaid according
to the circumstances which caused the property to be where it was
found. McAvoy v. Medina, 11 Allen 548 (Mass. 1866). The
English view was that property found on public land was lost
property, Bridges v. Hawkesworth, 21 L.J.Q.B. 75 (1851), but
that goods found imbedded in private grounds were mislaid. S.
Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, 2 Q.B. 44 (1896). Countless
distinctions were presented by the courts as determinative of
whether the property should be lost or mislaid, such as nature
of the article, its location, and the finder's relationship to land-
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owner-all difficult questions of fact which usually added up to
judicial speculation and probabilities. Aigler, Rights of Finders,
21 MICH. L. R. 664 (1923).
The American courts accepted the distinction as to lost and mislaid property, awarding possession of mislaid property to the
owner of the "locus in quo," Foulk v. N.Y. Con. Ry. Co., 228
N.Y. 269 (1920), and the finder was given possession of lost
articles. Bowen v. Sullivan, 62 Ind. 281 (1878).
Treasure trove must be either gold or silver coin, bullion or
plate, but it also has been held to include paper representatives
of gold or silver. Zornes v. Bowen, 223 Ia. 1141, 274 N.W. 877
(1937). Treasure trove is considered lost property and the finder
acquires the right of possession. Danielson v. Roberts, 44 Or. 108,
74 Pac. 913 (1904).
Property which is classed as goods attached to the soil is distinguished from treasure trove inasmuch as the historical definition of treasure trove does not include all chattels. Such chattels
which are intentionally buried in the soil are held to be part of
the realty, and therefore their possession is awarded to the owner
of the locus in quo rather than to the finder. Burdick v. Chesebrough, 88 N.Y.S. 13, 94 App. Div. 532 (1904).
In the present case, which is one of first impression in Texas,
since the court rejects the doctrine of treasure trove, it would
seem that the property in question must therefore fall into the
category of "property attached to the soil." The court rejects this
classification and arbitrarily classifies all property in Texas as
either lost or mislaid, sweeping aside all the other classifications.
The majority opinion reasons that the buried chattel is either lost
or mislaid depending upon the jury's determination. Whether or
not the issue is to be submitted to the jury depends upon the length
of time the chattel has rested in the soil. This reasoning is based
upon the strained presumption that the true owner has intentionally buried something and the passage of time, if long enough,
will preclude the owner from remembering his act, or in the alternative, if the time element is short, the jury may very well find
the property to be mislaid since the owner is presumed to recall
his act of burial.
As a result of this decision, it is evident that the landowner
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has prior rights of possession as against a finder of buried money.
However, the decision, in its classification of personal property
has created problems. Courts in the future will be faced with the
problem of how to determine a time criteria which the buried
chattel must meet before the issue is submitted to the jury, or in
what instances will the time of burial make it a question of law.
It will also be difficult to give a jury a proper yardstick with
which to weigh the issue.
The decision in favor of the landowner would be on a much
sounder basis if the property were more narrowly defined. It is
anamolous, in view of the common law, to allow a mislaid chattel
to become a lost chattel by the mere passage of time. The only
type of goods which could ever conceivably change its nature, so
to speak, was treasure trove, which at one time was obviously mislaid property, but its ancient character gives it the present status
of lost property, as far as the rights of the finder are concerned.
Since Texas has rejected the doctrine of treasure trove, this requirement of time in the soil seems out of place in the Court's
reasoning.
John R. Vandevoort.
PUBLIC OFFICERS-INVALID STATUTE-TORT LIABILITY

The defendant, an Idaho game conservation officer, shot two
dogs owned by the plaintiffs, acting under authority of a state
statute, which was later held unconstitutional, in that it deprived
plaintiffs of their property without due process of law. The plaintiffs contend that because the statute is unconstitutional the defendant is personally liable to them for the value of the dogs.
Held: The conservation officer is liable, because the statute permitting the shooting, being unconstitutional, can offer the defend290 P.2d
ant no protection. Smith v. Costello, - Idaho -,
742 (1955). (3-2 decision).
An invalid statute, i.e. one that is unconstitutional, is not law.
It is inoperative, a mere scrap of paper that confers no rights and
imposes no duties. The invalid act is of no more effect than if nc
act had been passed. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425
(1886); Chicago I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559 (1913).
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However, the actual existence of a statute which has not yet been
declared unconstitutional is an operative fact which cannot justly
be ignored. The question of the effect of its unconstitutionality cannot be disposed of by merely applying a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity. Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1939). Where a statute is found to
be unconstitutional and hence void ab initio, its existence before
it was declared unconstitutional will not be ignored. NLRB v.
Rockway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953); cf. State v.
Village of Garden City, 74 Idaho 513, 265 P.2d 328. (1953).
With regard to officers acting under an unconstitutional statute,
as in the instant case, the mere recent tendency of the courts is to
take the view that the officer cannot be required to determine legal
questions which would perplex a court, and that if he has acted in
good faith he should not be liable. Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa 378,
7 N.W. 623 (1880); Golden v. Thompson, 194 Miss. 241, 11
So.2d 906 (1943). This view has been expressed as follows: "The
rule that an unconstitutional statute is a nullity cannot be applied
to work hardship and impose liability on a public officer who in
performance of his duty has acted in good faith in reliance on
the validity of the statute before any court has declared it invalid."
Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P.2d 242 (1943); Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Harrison, 18 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Ill. 1937). However, there is a substantial following behind the contrary view,
i.e. that, since an unconstitutional statute is a nullity, it can offer
no protection to the officer who acts in reliance upon it. This view
was followed in the principal case and, because of the number
of early cases adopting it, would seem to be the majority rule.
Kelly v. Bemis, 4 Gray 83, 64 Am.Dec. 50 (Mass 1855); Campbell v. Sherman, 35 Wis. 103 (1874); Dennison Mfg. Co. v.
Wright, 156 Ga. 789, 120 S.E. 120 (1923); and see the collection
of cases in 53 A.L.R. 268. A recent Washington case in accord
with the principal case, has adopted this "majority" rule. State v.
Brotherhood of Friends, 41 Wash. 133, 247 P.2d 787 (1952);
and see People v. Berner, 10 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1939). However, the
decided trend of recent authority has been opposed to liability
on the part of the officer who acted in good faith. Gordon v. Connor,
183 Okla. 82, 80 P.2d 322 (1938); Texas Co. v. State, 31 Ariz.
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485, 254 Pac. 1060, 53 A.L.R. 258 (1927); and see PROSSER,
TORTS (1941 ed.) 153-154.
Texas cases have followed both rules. The Texas Supreme Court
was one of the first to take a stand favoring non-liability. Sessums
v. Botts, 34 Tex. 335 (1870), wherein it was stated that "[i]t
is advisable for every good citizen to obey whatever the lawmaking
power promulgates as law, until it be adjudicated by the courts
not to be law; and the rights of citizens are not to be prejudiced
by reason of such obedience." A later Texas case held that an
unconstitutional local option law did not protect those acting
under it from civil liability for the destruction of confiscated
liquor. Cartwrightv. Canode, 106 Tex. 502, 171 S.W. 696 (1914).
In 1954 this conflict was resolved by a Texas Supreme Court decision which clearly adopts the "good faith" rule quoted above.
Wichita County v. Robinson, Tex. , 276 S.W.2d 509
(1954).
It seems obvious that the better rule is contra to that of the
principal case. To arrive at this opposite result in view of the
invalidity ab initio of the statute has taken some adroit legal
juggling. Some courts have arrived at the desired result of nonliability by holding that there is a presumption that a statute
passed by the legislature is valid, and that an officer is entitled
to act in reliance on the statute by virtue of this presumption.
Dexter v. Alfred, 64 Hun. 636, 46 N.Y.S.R. 789, 19 N.Y. Supp.
770 (1892); Board of Commissioners v. A. C. Davis & Sons,
184 Okla. 258, 86 P.2d 782 (1939). Tennessee courts have
reached the same result by the somewhat unconventional holding
that an unconstitutional statute is not void, but is only voidable,
and thus public officers are authorized to treat every act of the
legislature as prima facie valid and are not liable for any acts
committed under an unconstitutional statute on account of its
unconstitutionality. Bricker v. Sims, 195 Tenn. Rep. 361, 259
S.W.2d 661 (1953); Roberts v. Roane County, 160 Tenn. Rep.
109, 23 S.W. 2d 239 (1929).
The same result can be and often is reached on the basis of
public policy, as in Sessums v. Botts, supra, and Henke v. McCord,
supra. See also Field, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute in
the Law of Public Officers, 77 U.PA.L.REv. 155 (1928). Inferior
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officers of the administrative and judicial branches should not
be forced to pay for the mistakes of the legislature. Liability in
such cases puts a terribly unfair burden on public officers where
those officers have done their duty in good faith. On the other hand,
it seems equally unjust for the private citizen to be forced to bear
the loss resulting from enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.
Logically it would seem that the loss should fall on the legisla.
ture which directed the unconstitutional activity. But, since all
suits against the state to enforce such liability are barred by the
principle of sovereign immunity, it would seem that the only
proper solution to the problem would be through legislation waiving sovereign immunity and providing for indemnity for officers
acting under unconstitutional acts of the legislature.
Robert N. Best.
SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTY-PRIVITY

OF CONTRACT

Plaintiffs purchased a can of apricot juice from a retailer. The
plaintiffs sought recovery from the wholesaler as agent or representative of the packer in a suit based on contract on the ground
that there was a breach of an implied warranty that the contents
of the can were fit for human consumption. The defendant's demurrer was sustained. Held: Privity of contract is necessary to
state a cause of action for breach of implied warranty. Lombardi
v. California Packing Sales Co., R.I.
, 112 A.2d 701
(1955).
Most jurisdictions recognize an implied warranty in the food
and drink cases, but generally privity of contract with the vendor
is required before there can be recovery for its breach. Newhall
v. Ward Baking Co., 240 Mass. 434, 134 N.E. 625 (1922),
Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A.2d 316 (1943), 1 WILLISTON, SALES 242. Privity of contract is required because most
courts consider the action on the warranty contractual in nature.
Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, 129 F. Supp. 404 (D. Minn. 1955).
There is considerable authority for the proposition that an action
on a warranty historically sounds in tort, however, and it seems
that the common law recognized two distinct warranty actions, one
imposed by operation of law as a matter of public policy, and one
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growing out of an action in special assumpsit. The requirement
of privity of contract was applicable only to the latter action,
which furnished the fundamental rules of modern contract law,
for the warranty imposed by law was in the nature of an action
on the case for deceit, although it was not necessary to plead or
prove scienter. 1 WILLISTON, SALES 368. Furthermore, only food
merchants were subject to this extraordinary liability. Roswel v.
Vaughan, Cro. Jac. 196, 97 Eng. Rep. 196 (1607), Burnby v.
Bollett, 16 M. & W. 646, 153 Eng. Rep. 1348 (1847). Also see
the statute of Rillory and Tumbrel (1266), assize of bread and ale
(51 Hen. III, stat. 6), and Keilway's Rep. 91 (22 Hen. 7), 72
Eng. Rep. 254. This warranty law originated a century before
the action of special assumpsit, 1 WILLISTON, SALES 368, but
grew unpopular because by bringing a warranty action in assumpsit litigants were allowed to include more money counts in
their petitions, although it was also necessary to plead and prove
privity of contract in these suits. See Lord Ellenborough's opinion
in Williamson v. Allison, 2 East 446, 102 Eng. Rep. 439 (1802).
Thus the action on the warranty imposed by law upon food vendors
fell into disuse, and was not even recognized in later English
cases, Emmerton v. Mathews, 7 H. & N. 587, 158 Eng. Rep. 604
(1862), although it was carried to this country as part of the common law and recognized in early decisions. Van Brocklin v. Fonda,
12 Johns. N.Y. 468, 7 Am. Dec. 339 (1815).
With the growth of assumpsit the necessity of privity of contract in an action on a warranty has been assumed to a large
extent, and only through the employment of various legal fictions
have the courts been able to give relief to an injured person who
has purchased deliterious foods from a retailer and brought suit
against a manufacturer or wholesaler. In some jurisdictions the
courts have followed a theory that the manufacturer, wholesaler,
and retailer dealt with each other and entered into a cbntract for
the benefit of the public, the ultimate consumer. Ward Baking Co.
v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928). The courts
which oppose this theory maintain that any benefit accruing to a
third party would be only incidental since the contract was not
intended to create any obligation to a third party. Colonial Discount Co. v. Avon Motors, 137 Conn. 196, 75 A. 2d 507 (1950).
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Other jurisdictions have held that the warranty runs with the
goods as a covenant runs with the land, and inures to the ultimate
consumer regardless of the lack of privity of contract. Vaccarezza
v. Sanquinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 163 P.2d 470 (1945). Still
other courts insist that public policy demands strict liability in
food and drink cases, and that privity should be implied in conscience so that the injured customer will have a remedy. This
view represents the modern trend, and in point of legal theory is
very close to the old warranty action rising out of deceit. Southwest Ice and Dairy Products Co. v. Faulkenberry, 203 Okla. 279,
220 P.2d 257 (1951), Heinsoth v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 1 111.
App. 2d 28, 116 N.E.2d 193 (1954), Burr v. Sherwin Williams
Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954).
It is submitted that if the privity requirement is to be done
away with, and thus strict liability imposed upon the food vendor,
it should be accomplished through legislation, and not through
the creation of various legal fictions designed to circumvent the
privity requirements. Although the courts in Missouri and Texas
have recognized that warranty law does exist independently of
contract law, and, consequently, that privity of contract is not
essential to bringing an action in the food and drink cases, Worley
v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 M.A. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532
(1953), Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164
S.W. 2d 150 (1942), it is unlikely that such a re-examination and
reform will be widespread. The passage of the Uniform Sales Act,
now adopted in 34 states, provided for only contractual warranties, although one state has held that it was legislative intent
to remove the necessity of alleging and proving privity of contract
where an action is brought against a vendor of food which is
unfit for human consumption. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co.,
14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P. 2d 799 (1939).
Legislation could allow the retailer to join his wholesaler or
manufacturer as a third party defendant where the retailer has
been sued by the ultimate consumer on the warranty. This procedure is a progressive one for it eases the privity limitation,
avoids multiplicity of lawsuits, and protects consumers from judgment proof retailers. In at least one state the courts have seen fit to
allow such a joinder. Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S. E.
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2d 822 (1951). If legislation were to go even further, it could
impose strict liability upon the food vendor upon the theory that
modern retail merchandising and advertising project representations to the consuming public apart from any contractual obligations between the manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer, and that
the seller should thus be held strictly liable for a breach of those
representations. Justification for strict liability can be found in
another manner also, in that the losses could thus be spread among
the consuming public by liability insurance carried by the vendor
of commodities intended for human consumption.
Ivan Irwin, Jr.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-PHYSICAL INJURY FROM MENTAL ANGUISH

D, telegraph company, through the company's messenger sent
word to P, that a telegram marked "death message" had arrived
for P, when in fact the interstate telegram stated the arrival of P's
daughter. In P's action against D, it was alleged that P had suffered both mental anguish and physical injury as the result of
D's negligence in the transmission of the telegram. The federal
district court granted summary judgment for D. Held: Allegations of mental anguish resulting from the negligent transmission
of a death message by a telegraph company states a cause of
action for the physical injury resulting from the mental anguish.
Kaufman v. Western Union Company, 224 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.
1955), certiorari denied, 350 U.S. 947 (1956).
The allegations necessary to constitute a cause of action for
negligence are: that an act of the defendant has breached a duty
owed by the defendant to the plaintiff and that such act is the
proximate cause of the damages suffered by the plaintiff. The
common law recognized no recovery where the alleged damages
were mental anguish alone. Victorian Ry. Commr. v. Coultas, 13
A.C. 222 (1888). Where the negligent act was established, the
courts disallowed recovery on the theory that mental anguish alone
was not an item of damages for which the law could allow recovery.
Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
Fear was frequently expressed that to allow such recovery would
flood the courts with litigation of this type, and the courts could
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not determine which claims were genuine and which were frivolous. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., supra; Mitchell v. Rochester
Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). Even if it were
apparent that the claim was genuine and some mental anguish had
resulted, recovery was still disallowed on the theory that the
mental suffering was a break in the chain of causation. Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry. Co., supra. This latter theory has also been used
by the courts as a basis for denying recovery when there has been
consequential physical injury after the mental suffering has occurred. These cases denying recovery should be distinguished from
two other situations where recovery has been allowed. First, where
a physical injury or impact has occurred, the courts have allowed
recovery, reasoning that the physical injury is the result of the
impact and not of the mental suffering. Homas v. Boston Elevated
Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902); Goodrich, Emotional
Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV. 497, 504
(1922). Second, where there has been an intentional or wilfully
negligent act which produced mental anguish and resulting physical injury, the courts have sometimes allowed recovery. Preiser
v. Weilandt, 48 A.D. 569, 62 N.Y.S. 890 (1900).
In a case construing sections 206 and 207 of the Federal Communication Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 47 U.S.C. § 151, 206 and
207 (1934), it is stated that the law applicable to interstate telegrams is federal statute and federal case law, notwithstanding Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). O'Brian v. Western Union
Telegram Co., 113 F.2d 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1940); Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Junker, 153 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)
error refused. Although it is beyond the scope of this note, there
might be some doubt that sections of 206 and 207 of 49 U.S.C.
151 are broad enough to allow tort suits on interstate telegrams
to be decided under federal case law and not state law as contemplated by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, supra; but the cases, such
as the O'Brian case, supra, have given a broad interpretation to
these two sections and have decided such suits under federal law.
The Supreme Court has held that mental pain and anguish resulting from an ordinary negligent act is too vague an injury to
allow legal recovery. Southern Express v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612
(1916); Western Union Telegraph Company v. Speight, 254 U.S.
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17 (1920). The federal district courts have held that there can
be no recovery for a physical injury resulting from mental suffering where no physical impact has occurred. Jones v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 233 Fed. 301 (N.D. Cal. 1916); Ey v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 298 Fed. 357 (N.D. Cal. 1924). The reasoning in these cases is that the physical injury resulting from
mental suffering is only a form of mental suffering and by the
Byers case, supra, no recovery is allowed for either mental suffering or any of its forms. Following the Jones case, supra, it has
been that the mental injury is a break in the chain of causation,
and therefore the negligent act cannot be the promixate cause of
the physical injury resulting from the mental suffering. Mees v.
Western Union Telegram Co., 55 F.2d 691 (N.D. Florida 1932).
The principal case held that the mental anguish can be the
proximate cause of the resulting physical injury, and that recovery should be allowed for such physical injury. The reasoning
illustrated by this holding is that the result rather than the nature
of the tortious act should be scrutinized to determine liability,
and therefore any physical injury occurring after mental suffering
is a legal injury for which damages are allowed. As a precedent
for the accepted reasoning, the court in the principal case relied
on two federal appellate court cases, which cases were decided
under state law and not federal law. Baltimore & Ohio v. McBride,
36 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1930); Belt v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.
Co., 195 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1952). The effect of the principal
case was to impliedly overrule the holding of the Jones case, supra,
and the other federal district court opinions advocating the impact
theory. Therefore, the present decision also limits the Byers case,
supra, to a situation where mental suffering alone is the basis of the
cause of action.
The result of the principal case is a step in the direction of the
modem trend in the tort field to allow recovery for any actual
physical injury suffered. This result has long been advocated by
text writers. The denial of recovery for the reason that there may
be frivolous claims does not seem to be a justified reason for
denying recovery where a physical injury has been proximately
caused by the negligent act of another. The states which allow
recovery in a similar situation seem to have found sufficient safe-
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guards against non-meritorious litigation. Although the decision
in the principal case is restricted to situations involving interstate
telegrams, the decision should be a guide for the states which
deny recovery.
Jere Hayes.
TORTS-THE

GUEST STATUTE-AMBULANCE

PASSENGERS

A young lady summoned an ambulance of the defendant to
take her to the hospital; she requested the plaintiff, her finance,
to accompany her. The plaintiff told the driver and the attendant
that he was going, and they replied that it would be all right.
The defendant's customary charge was $5.00 for each patient; it
was the practice of the funeral chapel within reasonable limits to
let relatives and friends accompany the patient without charge.
En route to the hospital the ambulance struck another vehicle.
The plaintiff proved ordinary negligence only. Held: The Texas
Guest Statute, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT., (1925) art. 6701 b, sec. 1, is
not applicable because the plaintiff is a guest of the patient, not a
guest of the ambulance owner. The majority of the court felt the
motivating influence for the transportation was the hiring of the
vehicle, which gave the patient, the right to ask the plaintiff to
accompany her. The three dissenting judges felt there was no
right for the plaintiff to ride, and that he was therefore a guest
within the statute. Cedziwoda v. Crane Longley Funeral Chapel,
Tex ............
283 S.W.2d 217 (1955).
..........
Common law courts have treated the gratuitous rider in an automobile as a licensee. Plummen v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426, 31 N.E.
128 (1892); compare Baines v. Collins, 310 Mass. 523, 38 N.E.2d
626 (1942), with Coffey v. Ouachita River Lbr. Co., 191 So. 561
(La. App. 1939). Corish, The Automobile Guest, 14 BOSTON U. L.
REV. 728 (1934); Campbell, Host-Guest Rules in Wisconsin, 18
Wis. L. REV. 180 (1943). As a licensee, the guest assumes the
ordinary risks of defects in the car, but the driver is under an
obligation to exercise reasonable care in operating the car.
Dashiell v. Moore, 177 Md. 657, 11 A.2d 640 (1940). If the
rider pays or otherwise confers a benefit, he is an invitee, corresponding to a paying passenger, and not a guest. Gage v. Chapin,
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115 Conn. 546, 162 Atl. 17 (1932); cf. Raub v. Rowe, 119 S.W.2d
190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); note, 51 HARV. L. REV. 545 (1937).
Following Connecticut, most states have covered the point by
statute. These statutes were passed for two principal purposes:
(1) to alleviate the likelihood of collusion between the insured
owner of the vehicle and the gratuitous rider; Ward v. George,
195 Ark. 216, 112 S.W.2d 30 (1937); and (2) to satisfy the
common feeling that a guest in an automobile should assume the
risks of the driver's ordinary negligence. Hodges, The Automobile Guest Statutes, 12 TEX. L. REV. 303 (1933). Under these
statutes, a guest may recover only if the host is grossly negligent,
or demonstrates reckless or intentional disregard for the guest's
safety.
A guest is the recipient of voluntary hospitality; he does not
confer benefit on the owner. Linn v. Nared, 133 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1939); Gledhill v. Connecticut Co., 121 Conn. 102, 183
Atl. 379 (1936); Drea v. Drea, 198 N.E. 743 (1935); cf. Fairman
v. Mars, 130 P.2d 448, 55 Cal. App.2d 216 (1942). To distinguish a guest from a passenger who does not come within the guest
statute, the courts have resorted to several guideposts, none of
which is completely satisfactory. Prager v. Isreal, 15 Cal.2d 89,
87 P.2d 870 (1939); Thomas v. Currin Lbr. Co., 283 Mich. 134,
277 N.W. 857 (1938); Henry v. Henson, 174 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1943) (no compensation paid); cf. Engel v. Int. Transit
Co., 9 Wash.2d 590, 115 P.2d 681 (1941); Connet v. Winget,
374 Ill. 531, 30 N.E.2d 1 (1940), conformed to 34 N.E.2d 878,
310 Ill. App. 533 (1941) (intent). Aucker v. Stechley's Hybrid
Seed Corn Co., 143 Neb. 24, 8 N.W.2d 451 (1943) (fact question). Where a wife accompanying the patient in an ambulance
agreed to pay his charges, the Washington Supreme Court left the
question of her guest status to the jury. Vogreg v. Shepard Ambulance Service, Inc., 44 Wash.2d 528, 268 P.2d 642; see also,
Rushing v. Mulhearn Funeral Home, 200 So. 52 (La. App. 1941);
Morales v. Employer's Liability Ins. Co., 202 La. 755, 12 S.2d
804 (1943).
A rider is not a guest if he bears a contractual relation to the
host or confers some benefit on him, Agnew v. Wenstrand, 33 Cal.
App.2d 21, 90 P.2d 813 (1939); compare Sproll v. Burkett Motor
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Co., 228 Iowa 902, 274 N.W. 63 (1937), with Wittrock v. Newen,
224 Iowa 925, 277 N.W. 286 (1938). See Burt v. Lochausen, 151
Tex. 289, 249 S.W.2d 194 (1952). In Perrinev. Charles T. Bisch
& Son, 246 Ill. App. 321, 105 N.E.2d 543 (1952), the court held
that a wife's assistance in caring for her patient husband tended
to promote the mutual benefit of herself and the ambulance owner,
and she was not a guest. Cf. Sheehan v. North Country Hospital,
273 N.Y. 580, 7 N.E.2d 701 (1937) memo dec.; Duran v. Mission
Mortuary, 174 Kan. 565, 258 P.2d 241 (1953); Robertson v.
Holden, 297 S.W. 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) (by implication);
rev'd on other grounds, 1 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Com. App. 1928).
Contra, Vogreg v. Shepard Ambulance Service, supra. Apparently, in these cases the plaintiff gave some benefit or consideration
in exchange for the right to ride. In the noted case, where the
plaintiff gave nothing, the majority assumed his right to ride
existed as an incident to the hiring of the ambulance. The dissent
flatly refused to make this inference. In other cases considered, the
allegation of a right was pertinent to the plaintiff's recovery.
Rushing v. Mulhearn Funeral Home, supra.
The majority of courts have indicated that under some circumstances the friend of the patient may be a guest within the statute,
but have held in specific cases that those circumstances were not
present. In this case of first impression the Texas court establishes
a novel approach to the ambulance problem. By holding that the
friend of the patient is not a guest of the ambulance owner because
he is a guest of the patient, the court implies that the friend of
the patient is never a guest within the statute, regardless of the
circumstances. Since there is little likelihood of collusion between
the funeral company the patient's friend, perhaps the statute
should not be applied in this particular class of cases. However,
since TEX. REV. CIv. STATS., (1925) art. 6701 b, sec. 2 expressly
exempts public carriers and the owners of motor vehicles being
demonstrated for sale from inclusion within the guest statute, by
application of the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
it would seem that the general rule stated in art. 6701 b, sec. 1
should be applicable in all other cases. It would also have been
helpful if the court had cited some authority for its decision.
Neil J. O'Brien.
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BETWEEN CAPITAL

AND INCOME

It is here presented for the first time in Texas the question
whether profitp resulting from the foreclosure of a lien comprising
part of a trusi estate and the purchase of the foreclosed property
by the trustee should be apportioned between the life beneficiary
of the trust and the remaindermen. The trust involved in this case
merely provided that the entire income of all property was to go
to the life tenant, and upon her death, to be divided among the
remaindermen. The trust property included a note for $1,300
which was secured by liens on a tract of land. Unpaid interest
upon the note amounted to $1,257.83 when judgment for the sum
of the principal and interest was entered in 1937. The judgment
stipulated that no personal liability was rendered, and that the
lien on the land was foreclosed. At the ensuing sheriff's sale, the
Trustee bid in the property. Afterwards the Trustee executed oil
and gas leases on the land receiving $9,770 in bonus payments.
This action was brought after the life tenant's death in 1952 to
determine if the heirs of the life tenant were entitled to a portion
of the land and the bonus payments. Held: The land and the bonus
payments should be apportioned between life tenant's heirs and
the remaindermen in the proportion that the accumulated interest
bore to the principal of the note upon foreclosure. (One justice
dissenting.) San Antonio Loan and Trust Co. v. Hamilton.
, 283 S.W.2d 19 (1955).
Tex .........
Generally, gains or losses in the value of the trust estate accrue
to or fall upon the corpus. A universal exception is found in the
case where a loss is caused by the foreclosure of a mortgage
investment where accrued interest income is due and payable
upon foreclosure. Here the loss is apportioned between the life
beneficiary and the remainderman in the ratio of the accrued
interest to the face value of the investment. See cases collected
in 103 A.L.R. 1271 and 129 A.L.R. 1314. The philosophy of this
exception, as announced in Cox. v. Cox, L.R. 8 Eq. 343, 344
(1869), is that "... neither the tenant for life nor the remainderman is to gain an advantage over the other-neither is to suffer
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more damage in proportion to his estate and interest than the
other suffers-from the default of the obligor."
A conflict is apparent in jurisdictions which have decided upon
the applicability of the apportionment exception to include cases
in which the foreclosure resulted in a profit. Accepting the philosophy that the apportionment doctrine is to maintain equality
between the interests of the life tenant and the remainderman,
Parker v. Seeley, 56 N.J. Eq. 110, 38 Atl. 280 (1897) held that
the same principle should apply to the case where a profit, instead
of a loss, arises.
The majority decision is well supported by an imposing array
of case law. Not only does the opinion trace the development and
extension of the apportionment doctrine but it also carefully distinguishes numerous cases apparently contra to the applicability
of the doctrine to foreclosure cases in which a profit arises. A
significant aspect of the case is the heavy reliance placed by the
current Supreme Court upon holdings outside their jurisdiction in
deciding a case of first impression. The lawyer seeking an initial
decision in Texas on his point of law should be encouraged by the
noted case to devote more liberal amounts of his time and his
brief to outside holdings than in the past.
Although the case provides an outstanding resume of the case
law on the subject of apportionment with relation to trusts, it is
difficult to account for the omission of any reference to the Texas
Trust Act, Vernon's Civ. Stats., Art. 7425 b. Even more troubling
is the fact that the holding seems opposed to the provisions of the
act relating to apportionment. Sec. 26 states that "this Act shall
govern the ascertainment of income and principal ...." Sec. 27 (b)
states "All receipts of money or other property paid or delivered
• . .as a repayment of a loan . . . or otherwise as a refund or
replacement or change in the form of principal shall be deemed
principal.... Any profit or loss resulting upon any change in form
of principal shall enure to or fall upon the principal." Sec. 35
provides for allocation between principal and income upon conversion of unproductive property. Sec. 35A provides specifically
that the value of property acquired through foreclosure shall consist of all moneys invested and advanced. Sec. 35B provides specifically that income shall be based upon the difference between
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the net proceeds received from the property and the amount which,
if placed at a 4% simple interest rate, would have produced the
net proceeds.
The retroactive application of the Trust Act to interpret trusts
executed prior to its enactment is questionable. In fact, Garcia v.
GarciaDeOrtez, 257 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), held that
the Texas Trust Act enacted in 1943 was not applicable to a 1936
transaction. On the other hand, the applicability of Sections 19
and 24, dealing respectively with the trustee's contracts and the
power of the courts, is expressly held not affected by the fact that
the trust was created before the Trust Act was enacted in American National Bank of Beaumont v. Biggs, 274 S.W.2d 209 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1954) error refused, n.r.e. Regardless of the applicability of the statutory provisions of the act to such prior trusts,
it would seem that the pertinent portions of the act would provide
excellent grounds for interpreting a point upon which the trust
is silent, particularly where the point also represents a case of
first impression.
The applicability of Sec. 35 dealing with apportionment of the
proceeds from the conversion of unproductive property to the
facts of this case is also questionable-in, that Sec. 35B apparently contemplates such proceeds to arise at the time of conversion,
whereas in the principal case no cash proceeds were obtained at
the foreclosure sale nor for a substanial period thereafter. But
these questions emphasize the need for a comprehensive discussion
of these uninterpreted aspects of the Trust Act by the Supreme
Court. The apportionment provisions of the act were designed to
resolve issues such as that presented by the noted case. The establishment of a judicial principle seemingly in sharp conflict with
the legislative will expressed in the act could lead to regrettable
confusion on a subject destined to become more important in the
future.
Granville Dutton.
TRUSTS-SPENDTHRIFT

TRUSTS-RIGHT OF MINOR CHILDREN

TO ATTACH FOR SUPPORT

The plaintiff, holding a judgment against her husband for the
support and maintenance of their minor children, sought to enforce
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the judgment by writ of attachment against the husband's interest
as beneficiary of a spendthrift trust. The trustees contended that
the trust assets were not amenable to attachment by the plaintiff,
since the trust estate was a spendthrift thrust "with the usual
restrictive provisions incident to that kind of trust. . . ." Held:
The public policy of the District of Columbia requires that the
interest of a father in a spendthrift trust may be invaded for the
support of minor children. Seidenberg v. Seidenberg, 225 F.2d
545 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
Any discussion today of the arguments for and against spendthrift trusts would be largely academic, since their validity is
recognized by the courts, and to a lesser extent the legislatures,
of a majority of the American states. For a collection of cases
see 119 A.L.R. 19 (1939), supplemented in 138 A.L.R. 1319
(1942). A few jurisdictions, adhering to the English view, deny
the validity of spendthrift trusts to the extent that they restrain
the voluntary and involuntary transfer of the beneficiary's interest.
Brahmey v. Rollins, 87 N.H. 290, 179 Atl. 186 (1935); Cecil's
Trustee v. Robertson, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 357, 105 S.W. 926 (1905).
In the latter jurisdictions, the settlor who would prevent future
alienation of trust income by the beneficiary is forced to adopt
some form of indirect restraint, the usual device being a discretionary trust. Thurber v. Thurber, 43 R.I. 504, 112 Atl. 209
(1921).
Where the spendthrift trust is recognized, the general rule is
that the interest of the beneficiary may not be reached by ordinary
creditors and the decisions are usually grounded on a public
policy which declares that the settlor has a right to condition his
bounty as suits himself, so long as no law is violated in so doing.
Canfield v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 13 Cal. App. 2d, 87 P.2d
830 (1939); Frensley v. Frensley, 177 Okla. 221, 58 P.2d 307
(1936). Although thus immune to the claims of ordinary creditors,
the courts have on occasions permitted certain classes of claimants
to reach the interest of the spendthrift beneficiary. For example,
the state has been permitted reimbursement for expenses incurred
for the support of the beneficiary, In re Walter, 278 Pa. 421,
123 Atl. 408 (1924); claims for services rendered the beneficiary
in the protection of his interest in the trust estate were permitted
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an attorney in In re Razall's Will, 243 Wis. 152, 9 N.W.2d 639
(1943); and it is likely that the federal government will be able
to reach the beneficiary's interest to satisfy claims for tax deficiencies. United States v. Mercantile Trust Co., 62 F. Supp. 837
(D.Md. 1945). For other instances in which the courts have
allowed the interest of the spendthrift beneficiary to be invaded,
see Griswold, Reaching the Interest of the Beneficiary of a Spendthrift Trust, 43 Harv. L. R. 63, 68-78 (1929).
Where the plaintiff asserts a claim against the interest of the
spendthrift beneficiary the court must weigh and choose between
conflicting public policies. In the principal case, the policy that
the settlor has a right to dispose of his property as he pleases
collided with the countervailing interest of minor children in receiving support from a father under a duty to furnish it. There
has been a considerable amount of litigation in regard to the
right of a dependent to reach the beneficiary's interest, and the
cases have not always reached the same result. Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and a number of other states have
enacted statutes which specifically permit the beneficiary's income
to be diverted to the support of the beneficiary's wife and minor
children. The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Section 157 (a),
supports this view. The Restatement rule has been cited with approval in Buchanan v. National Savings & Trust Co., 146 F.2d
13 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Robertson, 192
Md. 653, 65 A.2d 292 (1949); Dillon v. Dillon, 244 Wis. 122,
11 N.W.2d 628 (1943). Other courts, perhaps the majority of
those that have considered the problem, seek to ascertain the intention of the testator with respect to the beneficiary's dependents.
Where, from a construction of the instrument itself or from the
surrounding circumstances, no expression of the testator's intent
can be found the dependents almost uniformly have no trouble in
satisfying their claims. Eaton v. Lovering, 81 N.H. 275, 125 At.
433 (1924); England v. England, 223 Ill. App. 549 (1922).
However, where the testator has expressly manifested an intention
to exclude the beneficiary's dependents from sharing in the trust
benefits the courts of some jurisdictions automatically deny relief
to the dependents. Thus in Erickson v. Erickson, 197 Minn. 71,
266 N.W. 161, 267 N.W. 426 (1936), the Minnesota Supreme
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Court held that ".... it is the intent of the donor, not the character
of the donee's obligation, which controls the availability and disposition of his gift." Other courts have reached the same result
by placing claims for alimony or maintenance on a par with ordinary debts. San Diego Trust & Savings Bank v. Heuistis, 121 Cal.
App. 675, 10 P.2d 158 (1932); Roorda v. Roorda, 230 Iowa 1103,,
300 N.W. 294 (1941).
The court in the principal case assumed that it was the testator's
intention to exclude the beneficiary's children from the benefits
of the trust. Notwithstanding that intention, it was held that the
public policy of the District of Columbia required that the interest
of the father may be invaded for the support of his minor children. In reaching this result the court is to be commended for its
refusal to follow the dogmatism of those courts which treat the
testator's intention as something inviolate and without limitation,
even to the exclusion of those whose claims upon the beneficiary's
interest are supported by moral right and common decency. Of
course, the testator's intention does merit respectful consideration.
But, it is submitted, this intention would be best subserved by providing certainty in this area of the law through legislation, rather
than to base its recognition on judicial indulgence.
H. Wayne Wile.
WILLS-IMPLIED REVOCATION-SUBSEQUENT

DEVISE

INEFFECTIVE

Testatrix made a will in 1946 leaving all of her property to
her niece. Subsequently the testatrix married and in 1951 executed
a second will in which she left all of her property to her husband
for life with remainder to her niece, which was an illegal conveyance under LSA-Civil Code, art. 1520. The husband contended that even though the second will did not effectively dispose
of the property, it was a tacit revocation of the previous will.
Held: If two wills have incompatible devices, the more recent will
revokes the former, provided it is regular as to form, and it is not
necessary that it actually operate as a devise. Matter of Ryan,
228 La. 447, 82 So.2d 759 (1955).
It is a settled proposition in the law that before a will can be
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revoked it must be clear that the testator intended for it to be
revoked. Where the method or revocation is by writing another
will, the intention to revoke may be shown by an express statement to that effect or by making grants inconsistent with the first
will. In the latter case the court implied the testator's intent to
revoke from the fact that he has made a subsequent will which
is wholly inconsistent with the first will. This is known as implied
revocation. Wagner v. Wagner, 303 Ky. 140, 197 S.W.2d 86
(1946); Succession of Pizzati, 141 La. 645, 75 So. 498 (1917).
Some broad language can be found expressing the view that
intention is not the controlling factor where the first will is revoked
by a subsequent will. These cases hold that if the last will is to
dispose of the property as the testator provided, then as a matter
of course there is nothing left for the first will to act upon and
so it is rendered useless. Only one case has been found making
this rule absolutely clear, Austin v. Oakes, 23 N.E. 193, 197 (Ct.
App. N.Y. 1890), see also Swain v. Swain, 48 S.E.2d 425 (Sp. Ct.
App. W. Va. 1948). Obviously, this is not revocation at all, but
merely a mechanical formula. See ATKINSON, WILLS 450 (2d ed.
1953).
Of course, when the second will disposes of the entire estate
it makes no difference which theory is used, because the same
result will be reached whether it is said that the testator showed
an implied intent to revoke his previous inconsistent will or
whether it is said that the first will is now useless, due to the fact
that all of the estate has passed under the second will.
A problem arises, however, in fact situations like the princi.
pal case where the second will is in good statutory form, and
purports to dispose of the entire estate, but fails to do so because
of some outside rule of conveyancing. Most courts, following the
theory of implied revocation, hold that the first will is revoked
in light of the intent to revoke which is implied from the fact that
the testator has drawn a second and inconsistent will. Kearns v.
Roush, 146 S.E. 729 (Sp. Ct. App. W. Va. 1929); In re Weppermann's Estate, 300 N.Y.S. 344 (Surr. Ct. 1937) refusing to
follow Austin v. Oakes, supra; In re McClure's Estate, 309 Pa.
370, 165 Atl. 24 (1933). Other courts insist on the rule that if
the second will fails as a devise, it also fails as a revocation, and
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the estate passes under the first will. This is apparently the rule
in England, Sidegreaves v. Brewer, 15 Ch. D. 594,609 (1880).
The American cases which follow this rule have failed to make
their reasons clear. Some seemingly apply the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, and hold that the first will was only conditionally revoked, the condition being that the second will operate
as a devisee, In re Marx's Estate, 174 Cal. 762, 164 Pac. 640
(1917); Ewell v. Sneed, 136 Tenn. 602, 191 S.W. 131,137
(1917) (dictum); while others seem to base their reasoning on
the mechanical formula discussed earlier. In re Brodersen's Estate,
229 P.2d 38 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951); Lee v. Wilson, 138 Okla.
115, 280 Pac. 413 (1929) (dictum); contra, Phillips v. Smith,
186 Okla. 636, 100 P.2d 249 (1939).
The majority of the cases in the United States follow the principal case, and apply the theory of implied revocation in situations where the subsquent inconsistent will fails as a disposition
because of some fact dehors the instrument. It is submitted that
this theory is based on sound legal reasoning in that it looks to
the intent of the testator which is the prime factor in a revocation.
The mechanical theory as followed in England and a minority of
the American jurisdictions is highly fictional and ignores the
element of intent completely. This theory is mentioned by many
authors, but an analysis of the cases cited for the proposition
will reveal that most of them deal with subsequent inoperative
codicles, which presents an altogether different problem since a
codicle is usually integrated with the will and is prima facie a
republication of it, and not a revocation.
As shown, some of the cases which follow the theory of implied
revocation go one step further and apply the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, holding that not only did the testator intend
a revocation, but that he intended the revocation to be conditional.
However, it seems somewhat unrealistic to imply a conditional
intent from no more than the fact that the testator made two wills
with inconsistent dispositions. The court in the principal case did
not consider this possibility and ostensibly Louisiana is one of
the states that does not recognize the doctrine of dependent relative revocation.
Walter W. Steele, Jr.

